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 INTRODUCTION 
As this conference and the papers presented here illustrate, the issue of 
overcriminalization has moved beyond the critique of economic and 
regulatory crimes with which it began into mainstream commentary on 
criminal law.  Scholars now routinely link overcriminalization to such 
significant issues as the increased discretion of federal prosecutors, 
federalization of criminal law, notice problems in view of the breadth and 
vagueness of offenses, use of civil standards in evaluating criminal 
conduct, and debate over the consequentialist justification for criminal 
laws.1  Associating these trends with overcriminalization, however, 
provides a description rather than a definition of the term.  The absence of a 
definition makes it difficult to determine whether and how the propensity 
of Congress to enact criminal laws contributes to those issues. 
On a practical level, without a working definition, we fall victim to the “I 
know it when I see it” syndrome.  This syndrome allows those who oppose 
certain legislation to give it the negative label of overcriminalization 
whenever they do not like a new law.  Conversely, advocates of a new 
criminal law can defend legislation even when it may be unnecessary or 
ineffective.  Without a functional definition of the term, new crimes cannot 
be evaluated to determine on which side of the divide they fall. 
Current efforts to control the unlawful use of copyrighted material 
through criminal laws illustrate the “I know it when I seen it” syndrome.  
Proponents of using criminal law to protect the interests of those who hold 
copyrights view criminalization as a natural evolution—an inevitable 
recognition of the economic value of music, films, and other copyrighted 
material and the harm that infringers can cause.  Others view these changes 
as an inappropriate extension of the reach of criminal law that threatens the 
public’s right to use copyrighted material lawfully.  Which view is more 
accurate?  In order to determine whether the new laws “overcriminalize,” 
                                                          
 1. See Andrew Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, 116 LAW Q. REV. 225, 
225 (2000) (criticizing the “unprincipled and chaotic construction of modern criminal law”); 
Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It?  The Political, Social, Psychological and 
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 24-31 (1997) (noting that lawmakers favor high criminal sentences even 
though research indicates that harsh sentences may not increase deterrence); Dan Kahan, Is 
Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 470 (1996) 
(recommending a federal administrative criminal law to transfer to the executive the law-
making authority now exercised by the courts); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, 
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 770-88 
(1999) (discussing congressional strategy for delegating authority to prosecutors in the area 
of federal criminal law); J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1203-04 (1999) (assessing the relationship between white collar crime 
and the nature of criminalization and punishment); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 505 (2001) (explaining that criminal law 
covers far more conduct than any jurisdiction could punish and that it makes such conduct 
criminal many times over). 
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we need to have a clear sense of what the concept means. 
In this Essay, I suggest that a law overcriminalizes when the costs of 
treating conduct as a crime exceed the benefits of the new criminal law.  
This suggestion employs cost-benefit analysis, a methodology more usually 
associated with administrative law.  I use new criminal infringement 
statutes as a foil for consideration of this proposed definition.  Part I 
introduces the cost-benefit analysis methodology and generally describes 
how it is used in the legislation of social policy.  In Part II, after briefly 
reviewing the policy underlying copyright law and sketching the new 
criminal copyright offenses, I identify the benefits and costs of 
criminalizing copyright infringement for personal use and evaluate the 
analysis.  As this exercise indicates, the value of a cost-benefit exercise is 
that it accounts for all foreseeable consequences of criminalizing the 
conduct at issue, categorizing them as costs or benefits.  This rather 
common sense method provides at least a preliminary answer to whether a 
proposed criminal law confers a net benefit on the community as a whole.  
Part III treats the prospects for and limitations of using cost-benefit analysis 
to define overcriminalization and its general use in criminal legislation. 
I.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Economists devised cost-benefit analysis as a method to evaluate 
whether decisions would increase social welfare.2  Reduced to a simple 
conception, cost-benefit analysis is a method of comparing the advantages 
and disadvantages of a proposal in order to determine if it is a worthwhile 
expenditure of resources.  The methodology requires an accurate 
accounting of advantages and disadvantages and a consideration of 
projected costs as well as anticipated benefits.  The purpose of analyzing 
the costs and benefits of a proposed government project or administrative 
regulation is to ascertain whether the community as a whole would be 
better off by undertaking the project.3  The inquiry is driven by the 
                                                          
 2. See E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:   AN INTRODUCTION 7 (1971) (noting 
that economists ask “whether society as a whole will be made better off by undertaking this 
project rather than not undertaking it”).  As Professor Mishan explains, the project must be 
capable of producing an excess of benefits so that everyone in the community could, by a 
costless redistribution of the gains, be made better off.  Id. at 316-21.  Under the Kalder-
Hicks variation of cost-benefit analysis, the test is whether gainers would be able to more 
than compensate the losers.  See John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 
ECON. J. 696, 698 (1939) (explaining the Pareto principle as “each individual endeavoring to 
satisfy his tastes as is possible in view of the obstacles to satisfaction which confront him”); 
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939) (arguing that where an action results in physical 
productivity, individual satisfactions are of no matter to an economist evaluating the action). 
 3. See MISHAN, supra note 2, at 6-7 (suggesting that once the analysis of costs and 
benefits deviates from the “ideal economic scene,” the benefits of such an analysis to the 
public may be reduced, thus leading to misallocated resources). 
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understanding that what counts as a benefit or a loss to a part of the 
community—to one or more persons, or groups—does not necessarily 
count as a benefit or loss to the entire community.4  The ultimate judgment 
about a proposed change in the law will depend on how the community 
defines the social benefit it seeks. 
At least in theory, that same calculation guides the development of 
criminal law:  if the conduct is a crime, the entire community should be 
better off by treating it as such.  The community benefits by the prevention 
of harm that is effected by punishing and stigmatizing those who break the 
law.  In recent years, Congress, courts, and commentators have tended to 
justify criminal laws by invoking, as a consequence of treating conduct as 
criminal, the benefit of preventing harm.5  Although criminal law also rests 
on moral foundations,6 this utilitarian justification of punishment has strong 
roots in criminal theory.  Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarian decision-
making principles, urged that criminal penalties are appropriate only when 
they do not produce a greater harm than they would have prevented.7  Thus, 
to evaluate a decision to treat conduct as criminal, it is useful to consider 
the consequentialist justification on its own terms:  does a law produce a 
net social benefit?  Another reason cost-benefit analysis has special 
resonance in white collar crimes is that those offenses may also be deterred 
through tort actions and administrative enforcement, as well as through 
criminal laws.  In the specific case of intellectual property law, the 
community benefit is quite specifically defined through its decidedly 
utilitarian bargain between authors and the public.  For all these reasons, 
analyzing criminal copyright laws through a cost-benefit analysis is 
                                                          
 4. Id. 
 5. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules:   At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 
956 (2003) (criticizing tendency of lawmakers to consider the deterrent effect as the core 
purpose of criminalizing conduct).  For other critiques of this trend see Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment:   A Retrospective on the Past Century and 
Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003) (explaining that late 
twentieth century crime control emphasized consequentialist goals of incapacitation and 
deterrence); Kyron Huigens, What Is and What Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 811, 812 (2002) (arguing that lawmakers use consequentialist theory to 
promote social welfare by incapacitating anyone who threatens it). 
 6. Generally, the moral basis of criminal law is an imperative to exact retribution or 
just deserts for committing an immoral act or for causing harm.  See Peter Arnella, 
Convicting the Morally Blameless:  Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral 
Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1517-18 (1992) (questioning whether a criminal 
offender deserves moral blame where he knows his act was wrong and could have acted 
rationally at the time of the crime). 
 7. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in 
THE UTILITARIANS 162 (Dolphin Books 1961) (1789) (stating that punishment should not be 
inflicted “[w]here it is unprofitable, or too expensive:   where the mischief it would produce 
would be greater than what it prevented”). 
MOOHR 10/3/2005  1:37 PM 
2005] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 787 
appropriate.8 
In its normative guise, especially when a decision can be reduced to 
monetary considerations, a cost-benefit analysis leads inexorably to a 
decision on the merits of a proposal.9  An alternate vision of cost-benefit 
analysis eschews the normative cast and uses the result of the analysis as 
one factor to be considered in the final decision.  This variation of cost-
benefit analysis, in which decision-makers are free to reject the normative 
force of the analysis, is the form of cost-benefit analysis recommended 
here, for the reasons discussed below.  Cost-benefit analysis, even in this 
soft form, is advantageous because the decision encourages transparent and 
informed decisions.10 
II.   APPLYING A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TO CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT 
LAWS 
A cost-benefit analysis of a criminal law proceeds through three stages.  
In the first stage, costs, or negative consequences, are identified.  The 
second stage identifies benefits, or positive consequences, of enforcing the 
statute.  In the third stage, decision-makers assign weights to the costs and 
benefits and balance them against one another.  The following discussion 
adheres to that outline after briefly reviewing the doctrinal basis of 
intellectual property law and the new offenses. 
A.  A Primer on Copyright Policy and the New Criminal Copyright Laws 
Technological developments like digitization and broadband make 
copyrighted material increasingly vulnerable to unauthorized use, and 
copyright holders have not been shy about seeking the protection of federal 
criminal law.11  Responding to this pressure, Congress created the two new 
                                                          
 8. For recent commentary on the application of cost-benefit analysis to criminal law, 
see generally Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323 
(2004). 
 9. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 397 (6th ed. 2003).   
 10. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1037, 1037 (2000) (noting that cost-benefit analysis often seems to improve the quality of 
decisions); Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215, 
1229-30 (1998) (arguing that even when decision-makers do not deal in commensurable 
factors, a belief in commensurability might produce more thoughtful discourse).   
 11. The new criminal infringement offenses are part of two general trends.  First, 
Congress has used criminal law to protect a wide range of information products, confidential 
business information, trade secrets, and copyrighted material.  Second, the criminal 
copyright initiatives are part of a broader trend to extend more protection to copyright 
holders.  For a general summary of changes in copyright law, see David Nimmer, Codifying 
Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233 (2004).  On the use of criminal law to 
regulate use of information and intellectual property, see Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime 
of Copyright Infringement:  An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 
B.U. L. REV. 731 (2003) [hereinafter Moohr, Crime of Copyright Infringement]; Geraldine 
Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of Information:  The 
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crimes that are analyzed here.12  The enthusiasm for using criminal law in 
copyright matters is a significant change in Congress’ past treatment of that 
body of law.  As recently as 1985, the Supreme Court cited Congress’ 
caution about imposing criminal penalties for commercial, competitive 
infringement when it declined to treat infringement as theft for purposes of 
the National Stolen Property Act.13  Since then, Congress has moved in the 
opposite direction. 
1.  National copyright policy 
Whether criminal penalties are an appropriate way to deal with copyright 
infringement depends on whether the strategy confers a net social benefit, 
which is found in intellectual property policy.  National copyright policy is 
grounded in the Constitution, which instructs Congress to enact laws that 
give authors certain rights in their work for a limited time for the purpose 
of promoting progress.14  The Constitutional mandate expresses a two-fold 
purpose:  to encourage authors to create expressive material and to provide 
public access to that material.  Copyright law is thus a means to an end, 
rather than an end in itself.15  In this bargain authors receive a monopoly 
right for a limited number of years and the public receives free access when 
                                                          
Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853 (2002); Geraldine Szott Moohr, 
Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of Intangible Property Rights in Information, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683 (2000) [hereinafter Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud]. 
 12. Congress also increased the penalties for copyright crimes.  Commercial copying 
was traditionally treated as a misdemeanor that applied only to certain kinds of copyrighted 
material.  By 1992, a series of amendments had converted that misdemeanor into a felony 
that applied to any type of copyrighted material.  The maximum penalty for first offenders is 
now five years or three years, depending on the charge.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2004) 
(providing graded penalties for criminal copyright infringement); see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3 (2004). 
The offenses are a predicate act for purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”) and money laundering, both of which can significantly 
increase the penalty.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000) (money laundering); 18 U.S.C. § 
1963(a) (2000) (RICO).  Other recently-enacted offenses target related conduct.  See, e.g.,  
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000) (prohibiting unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound 
recordings and music videos of live musical performances); 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (2000) 
(barring trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords and copies of motion pictures or 
other audiovisual works); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2000) (barring trafficking in counterfeit goods 
or services). 
 13. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 223-26 (1985) (explaining that 
Congress’s decisions to impose felony penalties on copyright infringers were deliberate and 
cautious). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The First Amendment also plays a role in copyright 
doctrine, preventing the rights granted to authors from restricting the public’s right to free 
speech.  See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First 
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that First Amendment challenges to 
copyright law require more rigorous scrutiny than most courts employ). 
 15. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 351 (1991) 
(stating that copyright law assures authors rights in order to achieve a constitutional 
objective); see also Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting 
that granting limited monopoly rights to authors is a means of benefiting the public). 
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that term of protection expires.16  Creators of expressive material are given 
the right to control, and thus profit from, the copyrighted material for the 
limited term.  The right to control is not absolute, however.  The public has 
access to material that is not protected17 and may use protected material in 
certain circumstances.18  Despite this inherent tension between the interests 
of the public and copyright holders, the paramount purpose of copyright 
law is to secure a public benefit. 
2.  The new criminal infringement offenses 
Criminal law has played a limited role in protecting copyrighted 
material.19  Although willful copying for profit has been a crime since 
1897, criminal infringement applied only to those who copied for 
commercial, competitive purposes.20  Unlike civil copyright law, the 
criminal provision required that the infringement be undertaken “for 
profit,”21 reflecting the purpose of criminal enforcement—to protect 
copyright holders from unlawful competition.  The No Electronic Theft Act 
of 1997 (NET) alters this scheme by eliminating the financial motive 
                                                          
 16. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2004) (providing term of protection as the life of the author 
plus seventy years); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195-96 (2003) (holding that extension 
of the duration of copyrights by twenty years was constitutional). 
 17. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50 (distinguishing between the protection copyright law 
affords original expression and that afforded to ideas, facts, and imagination). 
 18. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1996) (limiting copyright protection to a work itself and 
not the ideas embodied in the work); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996) (providing a fair use exception 
for purposes including criticism, teaching, and reporting); 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1996) 
(permitting the owner of a copy or phonorecord to sell or dispose of it without the 
permission of the copyright owner); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2004) (defining the scope and 
availability of compulsory licensing in the context of phonorecords); Alfred C. Yen, What 
Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA’S Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 
WIS. L. REV. 649, 662 (summarizing limitations on copyright holders and elaborating on the 
concept of fair use of copyrighted material). 
 19. See generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization:   
The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness 
Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835 (1999) (discussing the intent requirement in the No 
Electronic Theft Act); Moohr, Crime of Copyright Infringement, supra note 11, at 733 
(arguing that new criminal copyright statutes do not conform with the rationale for 
copyright law); Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1705 (1999) (positing that harsh criminal penalties for copyright 
infringement will stifle the free flow of information). 
 20. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 221-23 (1985) (explaining that 
Congress viewed criminal infringement as an economic offense); United States v. 
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D. Mass. 1994) (describing how the 1897 Act’s limited 
application of criminal copyright infringement remained in place until Congress revised the 
copyright law in 1976). 
 21. In 1976, the term, “for profit,” was altered.  The new statute reads:   “Any person 
who infringes a copyright willfully . . . for purposes of commercial advantage or private 
financial gain . . . shall be punished.”  17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2004).  The new language 
retained the element of an economic motive.  See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 15.01(B)(1), at 15-16 (2004); Loren, supra note 19, at 841 
(emphasizing that the 1976 formulation did not change the requirement of financial motive). 
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requirement and expanding the definition of financial gain.22 
The second new statute criminalizes conduct that, although it is not 
infringing, may lead to infringement.  Taking advantage of technology, 
copyright holders protect digital material by encoding digitized products 
with electronic instructions that restrict unauthorized use.23  The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) essentially protects the codes 
that protect copyrighted material by barring the sale and distribution of 
technology that can circumvent the protective electronic codes.24  This law 
has the odd result of keeping decryption tools out of the hands of those who 
have a right to copy the protected material.25 
Congress shows every sign of continuing to use criminal laws to protect 
the interests of copyright holders.  In the 108th Congress, the House passed 
a bill making it a felony to offer copyrighted works in a digital format for 
others to copy and to use a camcorder in movie theaters.26  Numerous other 
bills have been introduced, including one that would add the crime of 
attempted criminal infringement.27 
                                                          
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2004) (“Any person who infringes a copyright 
willfully . . . by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 
180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which 
have a total retail value of more than $1,000, shall be punished . . . .”). 
The NET defines “financial gain” to “include the receipt or expectation or receipt, of 
anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2004).  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(stating that trading and receiving copyrighted works meets the definition of a financially 
motivated transaction under the NET). 
 23. These measures, especially coding that limits consumers’ use of material they have 
purchased, have provoked significant controversy.  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence 
of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998) (examining self-help provisions 
employed by the creators of digital works and discussing their incompatibility with 
copyright and First Amendment principles). 
 24. See 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2004) (providing criminal penalties for willful violation of 
§§ 1201(a), 1201(b), and 1202); United States v. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (discussing the DCMA’s prohibition relating to the marketing and distribution 
technology used to circumvent protective technologies); see also Yen, supra note 18, at 
668-79 (proposing more moderate regulation of circumvention technology than exists under 
the DMCA). 
 25. See Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35 (stating that Congress has not eliminated the 
fair use of any copyrighted material, but noting that “[t]he fair user may find it more 
difficult to engage in certain fair uses with regard to electronic books”). 
 26. See Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004, H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. §§ 108-
110 (2004) (stating that the purpose of the law is to provide enhanced criminal enforcement 
of the copyright laws and to educate the public about the application of copyright law to the 
Internet). 
 27. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE’S TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 47 (2004) [hereinafter TASK FORCE] 
(detailing the taskforce’s recommended principles for drafting new legislation in the 
intellectual property realm), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2004/ 
ip_task_force_report.pdf. 
A criminal attempt provision may weaken or eliminate a defense to criminal 
infringement.  Congruent with civil copyright law, prosecutors must establish that a valid 
copyright exists, allowing defendants to argue that the material at issue was not subject to 
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Do these new laws overcriminalize?  The new copyright crimes present a 
closer question than those offenses that are the usual target of 
overcriminalization critics, such as economic and regulatory offenses.28  
Unlike the moral offenses that were also the target of early critics, 
infringing a copyright is freighted with some degree of immorality,29 and 
punishing immoral conduct is a traditional justification for criminal law.  
Similarly, unlike victimless crimes, copyright infringement imposes harm 
on those who hold copyrights and on national copyright policy.  Moreover, 
one index that signals overcriminalization—federalizing state crimes—
does not exist here because copyright laws are well within Congress’ 
purview.  We must also recognize that criminal law necessarily evolves to 
prevent emerging harms to lawful interests.30  Notwithstanding such 
preliminary evaluations, a cost-benefit exercise requires more than abstract 
intuitions, and the following discussion analyzes specific benefits and costs 
of criminal infringement laws. 
B.  The Benefits of Criminal Copyright Infringement 
1.  The benefit of preventing harm 
Infringement imposes two types of related harms—harm to the copyright 
holder and harm to the national policy of encouraging creative effort.  
Infringement harms the financial interests of copyright holders by 
depriving them of their statutory right to act as the sole distributor of 
copyrighted material and thus to receive income from sales and licenses.  
Creative artists are less likely to spend time and money creating products if 
they cannot earn a profit, which undermines the intellectual property policy 
embodied in the Constitution and in copyright law.  Deterring infringement 
makes it more likely that authors will profit from their work, thus 
                                                          
copyright law.  Federal courts have interpreted attempt law, however, so that the 
government need prove only that the defendant thought the material was subject to 
copyright.  See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 200-03 (3d Cir. 1998) (eliminating the 
defense of legal impossibility which allowed defendants to argue that the information at 
issue was not subject to trade secret law because it was not a trade secret). 
 28. In some ways copyright crime is similar to white collar regulatory offenses.  The 
copyright statute confers rights and obligations, creates a complex administrative scheme 
that is overseen by a government agency, and authorizes enforcement through private causes 
of action. 
 29. See Moohr, Crime of Copyright Infringement, supra note 11, at 765 (noting the 
immorality of cheating the copyright holder and disobeying the law). 
 30. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 289-91 (3d ed. 1982) 
(noting that criminal law necessarily changes as “misdeeds, once regarded as only mildly 
wrong, are now branded as . . . anti-social”).  For a classic account of the application of 
criminal law to new circumstances, see JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY (1952).  
See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Michael Tigar, The Right of 
Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (1984). 
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strengthening their motivation to produce original expressive material and 
furthering one of the goals of intellectual property law, which is to provide 
an incentive to create new products.  Thus, it is important on both counts to 
prevent unlawful copying, and one effect of criminal enforcement is that it 
deters the banned conduct.  Even so, the benefit of deterrence may not be 
as great as anticipated, and it may not exceed the costs of treating 
infringement as a crime. 
a.  Identifying the harm to copyright holders 
People who make their music files available to others over the Internet 
and those who download files are subject to criminal liability if the 
statutory monetary threshold is reached.31  File sharing, which allows 
people to obtain copyrighted music and movies for free, is the driving force 
behind current criminal law initiatives and accordingly is used here as a 
basis for discussing the cost-benefit analysis approach.  Bear in mind, 
however, that the new crimes apply to all kinds of copyrighted material 
whether or not digitized files and the Internet are involved. 
Holders of copyrights in music claim to have lost billions of dollars 
because of file sharing.32  Notwithstanding these claims, the reasons for 
declining sales in the recording industry are disputed by industry insiders 
and commentators.33  Moreover, new independent studies by economists 
empirically challenge the claim that file sharing accounts for all of the 
decline in sales.  The studies indicate that the reduction in sales attributable 
                                                          
 31. File sharers violate the criminal copyright provision if they copy or distribute at 
least $1000 worth of copyrighted material within 180 days.  17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2004).  
At current prices of CDs, that amounts to about 500 songs.  See Loren, supra note 19, at 
845-47 (detailing the effect of the NET Act’s scheme of liability).  In the rubric of copyright 
law, those who download files are viewed as having copied them; those who make files 
available for others to use are viewed as having distributed them. 
 32. See RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, ANTI-PIRACY (2003), at 
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (on file with the American University Law 
Review)  (claiming that the recording industry loses about $4.2 billion to piracy worldwide 
each year); see also Attorney General John Ashcroft, Release of the Report of the 
Department of Justice’s Task Force on Intellectual Property (Oct. 12, 2004) (estimating 
aggregate illegal Internet distribution of 2.6 billion songs, movies, and software programs 
and estimating total annual cost to United States of worldwide infringement companies at 
$250 billion), available at www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2004/agremarksprip.htm (on file 
with the American University Law Review). 
 33. For a review of the debate regarding the reasons for declining music sales, see 
Moohr, Crime of Copyright Infringement, supra note 11, at 754-55 (summarizing other 
causes of declining music sales, such as market saturation, high prices, changing consumer 
preferences, increased sales because of sampling, and competing entertainment such as 
cable television and computer games). 
In any case, the decline seems to have abated somewhat. In the first half of 2004, record 
sales rose by 10.2% over the preceding year.  Because downloading music continued apace 
during this period, the increase in sales indicates that the music industry may be able to 
coexist with the Internet.  See Daniel Gross, Does a Free Download Equal a Lost Sale?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, § 3, at 4; Ethan Smith, Music Industry Fears Bad Tidings in 
Slowing CD Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2004, at B1. 
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to downloading is significantly less than the claimed one-to-one ratio.34  
Every downloaded song does not represent a lost sale because not every 
downloader would have bought the CD on which the song is recorded.  If 
file sharing did not cause the observed drop in music sales, then making the 
conduct criminal is not a solution to the problem, and to the extent that file 
sharing had only a small effect on sales, the justification for criminal law 
loses force.  Thus, criminal infringement laws are unlikely to prevent the 
lost sales the industry claims is caused by file sharing. 
b.  Social norms about file sharing 
As anyone who has discussed the matter with a file sharer knows, the 
community has not yet embraced a shared social norm about the 
immorality of using copyrighted material for personal use.35  When file 
                                                          
 34. For instance, research by two economists at the Harvard Business School and the 
University of North Carolina found that peer-to-peer networks in 2002 did not affect sales.  
See generally Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record 
Sales:   An Empirical Analysis 2 (2004) (analyzing the economic effect of file sharing on 
record sales by utilizing records of actual file sharing behavior), available at 
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf (on file with author).  But 
see Stan Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring the Impact of File-sharing (2004) (arguing that 
Oberholzer and Strumpf’s unit of measurement—download records—may not reveal 
adequate information about the effect of file sharing on the industry as a whole), available 
at http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/intprop/ pitfalls.pdf (on file with author). 
In a study completed in October, 2003, Wharton School economists found that on average 
one downloaded song would reduce purchases of 0.2 copies of that song, which is a small to 
moderate effect.  See RAFAEL ROB & JOEL WALDFOGEL, PIRACY ON THE HIGH C’S:   MUSIC 
DOWNLOADING, SALES DISPLACEMENT, AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN A SAMPLE OF COLLEGE 
STUDENTS 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10874, 2004) 
(suggesting that to successfully measure the effect of unpaid music downloads would 
require the surveys of individuals’ music purchases and music downloads), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10874 (on file with author). 
David Blackburn at Harvard University finds that downloading causes a greater loss of 
sales for well-known artists but may increase sales for unknown artists.  On balance, he 
finds that file sharing significantly impacts music sales because sales of works by well-
known artists dominate the total industry sales.  See generally DAVID BLACKBURN, ON-LINE 
PIRACY AND RECORDED MUSIC SALES 1 (2004) (concluding that thirty percent fewer on-line 
files would have increased music sales in 2003 by about ten percent), available at 
http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~dblackbu/papers/ blackburn_fs.pdf (on file with author). 
Stan Liebowitz of the School of Management at the University of Texas at Dallas 
provides a rich discussion of complexities in the downloading issue.  See Stan Liebowitz, 
Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the Record Industry?:   The Evidence So Far, in 15 
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:   
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 229 (Gary D. Liebcap ed., 2004); see also 
A. Zentner, Measuring the Effect of Online Music Piracy on Music Sales (University of 
Chicago Working Papers, 2003) (finding that file sharing networks reduce the number of 
music purchases by thirty percent), available at 
http://home.uchicago.edu/~alezentn/musicindustrynew. pdf. 
 35. For commentary on social norms, see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social 
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).  For specific commentary on social norms governing copyright, 
see I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 305 
(2003); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws:   A Psychological 
Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 226 (1997) (reporting public attitudes about 
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sharers were asked in February, 2004, whether they cared about the 
copyright status of music they downloaded, fifty-eight percent answered 
“no.”36  Although there is some evidence that this attitude may be 
shifting,37 the significant gap between prevailing social norms and the 
values embodied in criminal copyright laws is likely to weaken their 
deterrent effect. 
Under any theory of deterrence, it is more difficult to induce law-abiding 
behavior when underlying social norms do not support the law.  Simply 
put, people are more likely to obey criminal laws that reflect community 
values or moral judgments of right and wrong.38  The internal control 
theory of deterrence suggests that people instinctively obey the law because 
they have internalized a set of values that mirrors social norms.39  
                                                          
the wrongfulness of violating intellectual property laws). 
 36. See LEE RAINIE & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET PROJECT AND COMSCORE MEDIA 
METRIX DATA MEMO:   THE STATE OF MUSIC DOWNLOADING AND FILE-SHARING ONLINE 11 
(2004) (noting that in 2000, sixty-one percent responded that they were not concerned about 
the copyright status of downloaded music; in 2003, seventy percent responded in the same 
way), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_ Filesharing_April_04.pdf (on file 
with author).  Earlier surveys indicate that well over half of the respondents did not view 
downloading music as immoral.  See Moohr, Crime of Copyright Infringement, supra note 
11, at 767-68 (providing survey results that suggest the lack of a community norm to 
condemn infringement of music, software, books, and movies). 
 37. Evidence suggests that the recording industry’s civil suits against file-sharers have 
had a deterrent effect.  See RAINIE & MADDEN, supra note 36, at 1; infra text accompanying 
notes 64-66 (discussing effect of recording industry suits). 
The content industry prevailed in its suits against companies that facilitated file sharing 
through a central server.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001).  The suit against companies that provide peer-to-peer software that allows computers 
to search the files of other computers failed, however.  See MGM v. Grokster, 380 F.3d 
1154 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).  Should the Supreme Court reverse the 
Ninth Circuit decision, the content industry may return to its policy of suing facilitators, 
with fewer suits against the public.  
 38. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990) (noting the most 
important reason that people comply with the law is that it comports with their views of 
right and wrong); Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society:   
Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account 
When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 722-24 (2000) (explaining 
that citizens abide by the law when they believe in the legitimacy of a law and the law 
reflects public moral values). 
 39. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME 1-3 
(1995) [hereinafter ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE] (suggesting that community standards 
play a large role in deterrence); TYLER, supra note 38, at 64 (noting that an individual’s 
sense of right and wrong can often be attributed to the morals of society at large); see also 
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 350 
(1997) (explaining that one who lives in a community where crime is widespread is more 
likely to commit crimes because people in the community are unlikely to view criminality as 
morally wrong); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 453, 468 (1997) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Desert] (explaining that people 
usually obey the law because they value moral behavior and/or fear the disapproval of 
peers).  
In addition, people obey the law’s directives because they respect its legitimacy.  See 
Tyler & Darley, supra note 38, at 708 (discussing two values that underlie a law-abiding 
society—“the belief that laws describe morally appropriate behavior, and the belief that 
legal authorities are legitimate authorities whose directives ought to be obeyed”). 
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Individuals who have internalized these values become self-regulating; 
they unconsciously modulate their behavior to make it consistent with their 
internal principles and values.  In copyright infringement, people are less 
likely to abide by the law because they have not internalized this new 
standard, which conflicts with the competing social norm that copyrighted 
material is available for personal use.40 
The absence of a shared social norm also influences those individuals 
who obey the law through conscious decisions based on external controls.  
The external control theory of deterrence suggests that people will act in 
ways that avoid the costs of breaking the law; rational potential offenders 
weigh the penalties and the likelihood of being prosecuted against what 
they hope to gain.41  When apprehension and punishment outweigh the 
advantages of unlawful behavior, individuals will refrain from the 
behavior.  But such rational potential offenders must first realize that they 
risk criminal penalties.42  In order to stimulate that realization and deter 
illegal conduct, consequentialists suggest increasing criminal penalties and 
enforcement efforts.43  Unfortunately, in order to obtain adequate 
deterrence of copyright infringement, legislators may need to increase 
penalties to unpalatable levels that do not reflect the harm or moral content 
of the violation, increase markedly the dollars spent on enforcement, or 
both.44 
                                                          
 40. See Moohr, Crime of Copyright Infringement, supra note 11, at 771-73 (noting the 
presence of a powerful competing social norm—that the public is free to use copyrighted 
material so long as their use is personal). 
 41. See Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 345 (Boudewijn Boiuckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (explaining 
deterrence theory as “a special case of the general theory of rational behavior under 
certainty”).  See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:   An Economic 
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (addressing the question of how punishment should 
be quantified and how resources should be allocated to enforce legislation); Darren Bush, 
Law and Economics of Restorative Justice:   Why Restorative Justice Cannot and Should 
Not Be Solely About Restoration, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 439 (2003) (suggesting that a criminal 
law that combines deterrence and restorative justice could improve the efficiency of the 
criminal justice system); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal 
Law as a Preference Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1 (discussing the preference-shaping 
function of criminal law and distinguishing between criminal and tort law on the basis of 
preference-shaping policy). 
 42. Behavioral economists have shown that personal characteristics, such as optimism, 
may interfere with the rational calculation that leads to deterrence.  See, e.g., Baruch 
Fischoff et al., Facts Versus Fears:   Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY:   HEURISTICS AND BIASES 468-70 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) 
(explaining that when people repeatedly engage in dangerous behavior without any 
consequence they are likely to believe the activity is not dangerous). 
 43. For application of this general theory to copyright law, see Mark A. Lemley & R. 
Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1399 (2004) (suggesting that prosecuting a small number of high-
volume uploaders would have a strong deterrent effect on others). 
 44. See id. at 1402 (recognizing that the level of sanction imposed on the few who are 
pursued may seem “radically disproportionate” to the crime). 
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A variant of the external control theory of deterrence suggests that some 
potential offenders might avoid conduct out of fear of disgrace.  Again, 
when there is no shared social norm against infringement for personal use, 
individuals may not realize the conduct is criminal so that the negative 
incentive of being branded a felon has less effect.  If they do violate the 
law, they are unlikely to experience the full impact of being branded as a 
felon because the criminal stigma does not attach.  In the absence of a 
social norm, the incentive to obey the law is weaker because there is no 
negative consequence for disobeying.  In sum, whether planned deterrence 
is a result of external laws or individuals’ internal controls, the absence of a 
robust social norm against copyright infringement indicates that a criminal 
law will not deter infringement at the desired level. 
2.  The educative benefit 
An educative consequence of criminalizing conduct, closely related to 
deterrence, may also be classified as beneficial.  The theory is that the 
formal legislative statement, issued in the name of the community, educates 
the public and thereby forms new social norms against infringement.45  It 
seems reasonable to assume that educating the public about the existence 
and thrust of the law will increase law-abiding behavior to some extent, 
even among those who do not share its underlying value.  That is, 
education may change behavior.  Whether the formal statement can change 
underlying social norms, however, cannot be so readily assumed. 
Scholars have long considered the reciprocal relation between law and 
community values,46 but it remains unclear how criminal laws would 
operate in the context of copyright laws.  On the one hand, the educative 
benefit of criminalizing copyright may be significant because the nuanced 
prohibitions of copyright law do not proclaim a clear standard of conduct 
and ultimately confuse consumers.47  On the other hand, if the underlying 
                                                          
 45. Although this essay is purposefully confined to the consequentialist framework for 
criminal law, it bears noting that using criminal law to educate the public gives short shrift 
to the retributive, moral justification for criminal law.  Under that theory, criminal law is 
most appropriately used to enforce established community norms.  Violators are subject to 
moral condemnation and stigma precisely because the criminal law embodies and expresses 
the community’s norms.    
 46. See Johannes Andenaes, General Prevention—Illusion or Reality, 43 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 176, 179-80 (1952) (noting that the secondary effects of punishment include 
forming and strengthening the public’s moral code); John C. Coffee, Does “Unlawful” 
Mean “Criminal”?:   Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American 
Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 200 (1991) (explaining that the creation of new criminal laws 
defines new societal views as to what constitutes blameworthy conduct); Stuart P. Green, 
Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:   Overcriminalization and the Moral 
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1554-56 (1997) [hereinafter Green, 
Regulatory Offenses] (discussing the reciprocal relationship between criminal law and 
society’s view of morality). 
 47. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 
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law is opaque, enforcing it through criminal law may not make it any 
clearer.  Criminal laws are most effective in educating the public when the 
prohibition is “Thou Shalt Not,” and are less so when the prohibition is 
“Thou shalt not copy under certain circumstances and certain conditions.”48 
In any case, the possibility of creating social norms through criminal law 
may be a chimera.  Research indicates that criminal law is best viewed as a 
mechanism to reinforce community values that already exist.49  Criminal 
laws operate indirectly on individuals by influencing and strengthening 
group norms,50 which individuals then internalize through interactions 
during childhood with family members and friends.51  This is not to suggest 
that criminal law cannot affect community values.  Environmental laws are 
often cited as a successful example of using law to educate the public.52  In 
that case, however, a significant grass roots effort supported environmental 
protection.53  In the case of copyright infringement, the grass root support 
generally goes the other way, in favor of no criminal liability.  Support for 
criminal copyright laws comes from copyright holders, and the new laws 
have been characterized as the result of their successful lobbying efforts.54 
                                                          
49-51 (1994) (noting that statutes pertaining to copyright are complex and confusing and 
citing licenses to perform music as an example); see also Christopher Jensen, The More 
Things Change, The More They Stay the Same:   Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social 
Norms, 56 STAN. L. REV. 531, 544 (2003) (characterizing copyright law as an intricate web 
of contractual and statutory arrangements that channel money from consumers to artists 
through middlemen). 
 48. Jensen, supra note 47, at 532-33. 
 49. See Robinson & Darley, Desert, supra note 39, at 473-74 (presenting evidence that 
“[p]assing a law cannot itself create a norm”). 
 50. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 46-47 (1997) (suggesting that criminal laws may have a 
greater impact on reinforcing the behavior of law-abiding citizens than on changing the 
behavior of lawbreakers). 
 51. See Robinson & Darley, Desert, supra note 39, at 468-71 (explaining that children 
are taught to internalize cultural norms by a powerful socialization process); see also Hardy, 
supra note 35, at 332-33 (commenting that instincts formed in childhood experiences about 
property are stronger than rational understandings of abstract rights in intangible property). 
 52. See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future:   
Civic Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733, 737 (1996) (arguing that environmental law “has come to 
incorporate a set of principles representing and accounting for civic values that extend far 
beyond the realm of science and current events”).  Another often cited example is insider 
trading, which excites community condemnation, even when the harm imposed by such 
trades is diffuse and does not always occur.  See LEO KATZ, ILL GOTTEN GAINS:   EVASION, 
BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 171-73 (1996) (noting that most 
people believe insider trading is clearly wrong despite the inability to define any concrete 
harm that the insider has caused). 
 53. See David Sive & Daniel Riesel, A Grass-Roots Fire Spread Through the Law, 
NAT’L L.J., Nov. 29, 1993, at S24 (describing the grass roots efforts by many individuals to 
heighten public awareness of the need for environmental law). 
 54. See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL 
L. REV. 857, 903 (1987) (concluding that the 1976 Copyright Act skewed copyright law 
toward proprietors because of Congress’ reliance on industry specialists); Jessica Litman, 
Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 22-23 (1996) (claiming 
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In the case of environmental law, there was also no competing social 
norm that valued pollution.  In copyright, there is a powerful competing 
social norm that is enshrined in copyright law itself—that the public is free 
to use material, subject to civil law limitations.  Except for possible long-
term educative effects, the benefit of using criminal law to educate the 
public about copyright norms is not particularly promising. 
3.  A note on enforcement efforts 
Effective deterrence depends on criminal and civil enforcement efforts, 
which give concrete meaning to statutory prohibitions.  Thus, the 
Department of Justice issues periodic press releases that announce arrests 
and warn about the wrongfulness of file sharing and other infringing 
activities.55  Nevertheless, some members of Congress have criticized DOJ 
efforts, and the content industries are likely to continue to lobby for 
increased enforcement.56  The expense of civil suits and the problem of 
collecting damages from consumers motivate the industry to shift the cost 
of enforcement to the criminal justice system and ultimately to taxpayers. 
The DOJ, however, has shown little enthusiasm for actively pursuing 
consumers who engage in file sharing.57  DOJ statistics, which do not 
differentiate between commercial and personal use infringers, show that in 
2003 U.S. Attorneys investigated only eighty-eight copyright matters and 
filed charges against fifty defendants; the preceding three years show 
similar statistics.58  If other copyright-related offenses like bootlegging are 
included, 229 crimes were investigated and charges were brought against 
165 people.59 
There are nevertheless some signs that the DOJ is beginning to take 
                                                          
that, until recently, copyright law was geared primarily toward commercial participants in 
copyright-related businesses); Lanier Saperstein, Comment, Copyrights, Criminal Sanctions 
and Economic Rents:   Applying the Rent Seeking Model to the Criminal Law Formulation 
Process, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1470 (1997). 
 55. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SECTION (CCIPS), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cyber crime/docs.html#doca 
(last updated Mar. 17, 2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (collecting 
press releases relating to enforcement of intellectual property laws). 
 56. See Bill Holland, Royalty Bill Heads to Bush, BILLBOARD, Dec. 4, 2004, at 6 
(discussing a number of unresolved bills created to enforce copyright infringement laws). 
 57. See Jonathan Band & Masanobu Katoh, Members of Congress Declare War on P2P 
Networks, J. INTERNET L., Oct. 2003, at 22 (noting that criminal enforcement against 
personal use infringers has not been a DOJ priority because the public is not interested in 
seeing students sent to prison for file sharing).  For commentary on the resistance of law 
enforcers to the effort of lawmakers to change social norms, see Dan M. Kahan, Gentle 
Nudges vs. Hard Shoves:   Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 
(2000) (recommending that lawmakers “gently nudge” citizens toward desired behavior and 
attitudes by using less draconian penalties). 
 58. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FY 2003 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, available at  
www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar2003/appendices.htm#cc (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). 
 59. Id. 
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personal use infringement more seriously.  Former Attorney General John 
Ashcroft recently announced that the DOJ had committed more resources 
to combating infringement, including adding personnel to district offices.60  
In August, 2004, federal investigators mounted a complex enforcement 
effort against peer-to-peer file sharers alleged to have copied and 
distributed movies, software, games, and music.61  The initiative targeted 
those who made copies available for others to download.  As a result, two 
men recently pleaded guilty to criminal copyright infringement for 
participating in peer-to-peer file sharing and face sentences of up to five 
years.62 
Civil enforcement of copyright laws provide an alternative to criminal 
enforcement and can also deter infringement.  Civil copyright law provides 
for generous statutory damages and enhanced damages when infringement 
is willful.63  Despite this source of redress, copyright holders have been 
reluctant to sue consumers.  Civil suits are expensive, may alienate 
consumers, and are unlikely to yield the copyright holder the full amount of 
awarded damages.  That reluctance to use civil suits has been set aside, 
however, and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is 
suing individual file sharers on behalf of copyright holders.64  To the extent 
                                                          
 60. See TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 19-20 (outlining recommendations for 
significantly expanding enforcement). 
 61. See Terry Frieden, Feds Launch Internet Crime Crackdown, CNN.com, Aug. 26, 
2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/08/26/cybercrime.probe/ (on file with the 
American University Law Review) (reporting a raid of locations in three states targeting a 
peer-to-peer network known as the “Underground Network”); Press Release, United States 
Department of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Announces First Criminal Enforcement 
Action Against Peer-to-Peer Copyright Piracy (Aug. 25, 2004) (stating that enforcement 
officials seized computers, software, and other equipment used to distribute movies, music, 
and other materials over peer-to-peer networks), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/operation_ gridlock.htm.  Operation Digital 
Gridlock marked the first time that the government targeted users of peer-to-peer networks.  
Id. 
 62. See First Convictions in Peer-to-Peer Piracy Fight, USA TODAY, Jan. 19, 2005 
(noting that the offenders operated networks in which file-sharers shared from one to one-
hundred gigabytes of data), available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/ 
internetprivacy/2005-01-19-file-share_x.htm.    
 63. Those who infringe copyrights for personal use are subject to civil suits brought by 
copyright holders.  17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1996).  Damages can be substantial.  First, copyright 
holders may sue for actual damages.  17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1996).  Alternately, if they have 
met registration requirements, plaintiffs may elect to recover statutory damages of up to 
$30,000 with respect to any one work.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1996 & Supp. 2004).  When 
the plaintiff has proved the infringement was committed willfully, the court may increase 
the statutory damage award up to $150,000 per work.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1996 & Supp. 
2004). 
 64. See Press Release, Recording Industry Association of American, Recording 
Industry Begins Suing P2P File Sharers Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online 
(Sept. 8, 2003) (describing the first wave of lawsuits by the RIAA’s member companies 
against peer-to-peer users), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/ newsletter/090803.asp; 
see also Press Release, Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Files New 
Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Against 754 Illegal File Sharers (Dec. 16, 2004) 
(announcing new lawsuits against 754 individuals, including twenty university students), 
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this effort is effective, it reduces the need for criminal law enforcement. 
Evidence suggests that the RIAA suits may have had a deterrent effect 
on music file sharing.  Following the first round of recording industry suits 
against peer-to-peer file sharers in 2003, downloading appeared to 
decline.65  A follow-up survey indicated that three months later, the rate of 
file sharing had modestly increased from fourteen percent to eighteen 
percent.66 
In sum, the deterrence of infringement through criminal law may be less 
effective than anticipated, a general educative benefit is unlikely to change 
underlying social norms about personal use of copyrighted material, and 
enforcement efforts are uncertain.  For these reasons, the benefit of using 
criminal law is smaller than might otherwise be anticipated.  In contrast, 
the costs of using criminal law may be larger than expected. 
C. The Costs of Criminal Infringement 
Legislators seldom consider the costs of using criminal law.  Those costs 
include financial expenses that can be predicted and quantified as dollar 
amounts, such as the community’s costs of enforcement and incarceration.  
Economic harm to families of the convicted and the value of the 
imprisoned felon’s lost income can also be estimated and should be 
included in the tally.67  If these items were the only costs, we could 
compare an estimate of the dollars gained by deterrence with the dollars 
spent on enforcement.  But the cost of invoking criminal law entails more 
than dollars.  Though some of these costs are not readily subject to 
quantification, it would be misleading to ignore them.  The following 
sections discuss three non-monetary costs:  the effects on public access, the 
underlying policy of copyright law, and the criminal law itself. 
1.   Costs of reduced access to copyrighted material and costs to copyright 
policy 
Copyright law delineates rights of both copyright holders and the public. 
New criminal laws—and their interpretation and enforcement—should 
account for both interests.  Put another way, a new offense should cause no 
harm to either policy.  But using criminal law encourages the idea that 
copyrighted material “belongs” to someone in the same way that physical 
                                                          
available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/ 121604.asp. 
 65. See RAINIE & MADDEN, supra note 36, at 1 (reporting that the percentage of music 
file downloaders had fallen from twenty-nine percent to fourteen percent); see also 
BLACKBURN, supra note 34, at 3 (noting that downloads decreased after the RIAA brought 
civil suits against individual participants in file sharing networks). 
 66. See RAINIE & MADDEN, supra note 36, at 5. 
 67. See Brown, supra note 2, at 343-49 (describing various costs of criminalization that 
may be reduced to monetary terms). 
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property does, and that copyrighted material, like physical property, cannot 
be used without permission.68  This message is contrary to copyright law 
and policy, which accords the public certain uses in copyrighted material.  
In a global sense, treating personal use infringement as a type of theft 
creates a bias in copyright law that upsets the balance between the two 
purposes of copyright law.  Using criminal law to deter unlawful copying 
emphasizes one purpose of copyright law, to encourage creation of new 
work.  That emphasis on the incentive to create implies that the goal of 
maintaining public access is less important, an implication that undermines 
the balance between the dual mandates of copyright law. 
More specifically, criminal enforcement, to the extent it deters infringing 
activity, may also deter socially valuable conduct that is not unlawful.  
Such overdeterrence occurs when people refrain from lawful conduct 
because they fear involvement with the criminal justice system.69  In the 
context of copyright, the threat of being branded a thief and going to jail 
may cause a decline in public use of copyrighted material because law-
abiding citizens may refrain from using it even when doing so is not illegal.  
Although that might not be  viewed as problematic with respect to Internet 
file sharing of music and movies, the criminal copyright laws are not 
limited to file sharing. 
The complexity of copyright law makes overdeterrence of using all kinds 
of copyrighted material more than a hypothetical problem.70  Consider that 
users have to distinguish between the factual aspects of copyrighted 
material, which they are free to use, and the expression of those facts, 
which they may not use.  Similarly, they have to distinguish between the 
idea embodied in the work and the expression of that idea.71  The point is 
not that such good-faith users will be criminally liable, but that they may 
believe they are and so refrain from lawful use.   
                                                          
 68. See Stuart Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law:   Some 
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 
HASTINGS L. REV. 167, 215-16 (2002) (highlighting the distinction between theft of real 
property and copyright infringement); Moohr, Crime of Copyright Infringement, supra note 
11, at 765-66 (discussing distinctions between copyright and tangible property); see also 
Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 11, at 722-24 (addressing the dynamic of 
creating property rights by prohibiting certain conduct). 
 69. See United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1224 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that those 
citizens who obey the law out of a sense of civic obligation rather than fear of sanctions will 
alter their conduct); see also HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 68 
(1968) (noting the desire of law-abiding citizens to avoid involvement with the criminal 
justice system); Lynch, supra note 50, at 63 (suggesting that criminal law is most effective 
at speaking to the law-abiding public because it reinforces their values and behavior). 
 70. See Litman, supra note 47, at 48 (stating that “much of the activity on the net takes 
place on the mistaken assumption that any material on the Internet is free from copyright 
unless expressly declared to be otherwise”). 
 71. In addition, some uses of copyrighted material are protected.  See supra note 18 and 
accompanying text for a description of limitations on holders’ rights. 
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Moreover, chilling legitimate use of copyrighted material can have the 
further effect of decreasing production of expressive creation.  Most 
copyrighted works are based, directly or indirectly, on the work of others.72  
Potential creators may be reluctant to use copyrighted work, which is a sort 
of “raw material” for new work, when the potential cost of doing so is very 
high.73  In this sense, overdeterrence burdens the incentive to create in 
much the same way that higher license fees would.74  Although 
criminalizing copyright infringement may motivate creative activity by 
increasing its potential value, it may also reduce the material that is 
available for creative use and as a result lead to less creative output.  
Admittedly one cannot be certain that a criminal law will overdeter in this 
way or have this effect, but it seems inconsistent to rely on criminal law 
because of its power to deter and at the same time ignore the unintended 
consequence of overdeterrence.   
In sum, using criminal laws against infringement may impose costs on 
copyright policy by reducing public use of all kinds of copyrighted 
material, creating a bias in copyright policy that emphasizes protection 
more than public use, and reducing production of creative expression.  In 
comparison, civil laws, with their generous statutory damages, can achieve 
a better balance because they do not run the risk of overdeterrence.    
2.  The cost to criminal law 
Instituting a criminal law regime to address copyright infringement, 
especially when infringement is for personal use, can impose significant 
                                                          
 72. For instance, a recent survey showed that “artists and musicians have embraced the 
internet as a tool that helps them create, promote, and sell their work.”  See MARY MADDEN, 
PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, ARTISTS, MUSICIANS AND THE INTERNET iv 
(2004) (reporting that fifty-two percent of all online artists and fifty-nine percent of paid 
online artists say they get ideas and inspiration for their work from searching online), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/ pdfs/PIP_Artists.Musicians_Report.pdf.  The 
survey also revealed that thirty-five percent of artists and thirty-three percent of musicians 
thought downloading a music or movie file should be legal.  Id. 
 73. Desisting from creative activity does not produce an observable event, making it 
hard to prove this proposition directly.  Nonetheless, economists provide evidence from 
antitrust law showing that compliance measures adopted by firms to avoid antitrust 
problems have the effect of eliminating some lawful actions.  See Alan Beckenstein & H. 
Landis Gabel, The Economics of Antitrust Compliance, S. ECON. J., Jan. 1986, at 691 (“If 
public policy makers hope to reduce antitrust violations without at the same time reducing 
healthy competitive aggressiveness, then policies to raise fines and reduce the probability 
that violations go unprosecuted will have to be coupled with policies to reduce the 
likelihood that legitimate behavior is legally challenged by enforcement agencies or private 
parties.”); see also Michael K. Block & Joseph Gregory Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust 
Deterrence, Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?,  68 GEO. L.J. 1131, 1133 (1980) 
(arguing that overinvestment in private enforcement is one reason not to combine a low 
level of enforcement with excessive penalties). 
 74. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989) (noting that increasing costs of using copyrighted 
material may result in less production of innovative material). 
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costs on the future effectiveness of the criminal law and may even prove 
counterproductive.  Criminal enforcement actions that impose harsh 
penalties for conduct that is not viewed as immoral or harmful can lower 
the community’s  respect for the criminal law and thereby diminish both its 
legitimacy and its general effectiveness.75  People who have not 
internalized the legal standard may obey the law because they respect its 
legitimacy,76 even when social norms are in transition.  But if respect and 
legitimacy are diminished, people will be less likely to obey or to impose 
informal sanctions on others. 
Respect and legitimacy are threatened when a community norm  that 
condemns prohibited conduct is not yet in place.  In that situation, criminal 
enforcement coupled with severe penalties can make pawns of those caught 
in the transition period and offend community notions of due process, 
fairness, and commonly held ideas about notice and legality.  If the 
community believes these severe sanctions are disproportionate to the 
offense, especially if only a small percentage of personal infringers are 
targeted, then enforcing criminal infringement crimes may be detrimental.  
To the extent that citizens reject rules that target people unfairly, they may 
similarly reject the legal system that promulgates and enforces such rules.  
In these circumstances, enforcing rules that do not embody a shared 
community norm may actually undermine the formation of a norm against 
the forbidden conduct.77 
                                                          
 75. This is a theme of early critics of regulatory crimes.  See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 421 (1958) (observing that use 
of criminal sanctions for morally neutral laws dilutes the effectiveness of community 
condemnation for criminal conduct in general); SANFORD H. KADISH, The Crisis of 
Overcriminalization, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT:   ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 21, 22-32 
(1987) (explaining the social costs of punishing conduct that does not significantly harm 
society); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in 
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 437 (1963) (explaining that 
democratic communities are reluctant to affix blame to conduct that lacks moral 
culpability).  The theme has been revived by more recent scholarship.  See Robinson & 
Darley, Desert, supra, note 39, at 481 (noting that the deterrent effect of sentences may be 
undermined when the community views punishment as disproportionate and unjust).  For 
current commentary on regulatory crime, see Green, Regulatory Offenses, supra note 46, at 
1542-44; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:   
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 11-18 (2002) (describing the 
regulatory responses to corporate fraud in recent years). 
 76. See TYLER, supra note 38, at 178 (citing empirical evidence that suggests 
Americans feel a strong obligation to obey the law and generally do so). 
 77. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5, at 986 (noting that when people believe a law 
is unjust they may then perceive the legal system as a whole to be unjust, which leads to a 
generalized contempt for the criminal justice system); William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating 
Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1882 (2000) (explaining why broader criminalization of lying 
over the last century has failed to create stronger societal norms against lying and may 
actually undermine the societal norm against it). 
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D.  Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Criminal Infringement 
The assessment of benefits and costs indicates that the deterrent benefit 
of criminalizing infringement may be limited, while the costs to copyright 
policy and long-term effectiveness of the criminal law may be large.  
Although this assessment is not definitive,78 identifying costs and benefits 
makes it possible for decision-makers to compare and balance them.  That 
final assessment and the process of identifying and classifying effects is 
useful when a legislature considers a criminal enforcement measure.  As a 
preliminary matter, the possibility that costs of criminalizing personal-use 
infringement may outweigh its benefits serves as a signal to lawmakers that 
treating infringement as a crime may not be an effective way to protect the 
long-term interests of copyright holders or the public.  For our purposes, 
the cost-benefit analysis also serves a second function; it provides a 
specific conceptualization of the concept of overcriminalization. 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF DEFINING OVERCRIMINALIZATION THROUGH COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Defining overcriminalization as occurring when the costs of criminal 
enforcement outweigh the benefits serves as a screening device for 
proposed criminal legislation.  Laws that survive the screening process are 
likely to be more specific as lawmakers tailor them to avoid unnecessary 
costs.  This definitional strategy may also result in less reliance on criminal 
law as a regulatory device and, perhaps, fewer criminal laws.  These results 
may have the further effect of avoiding or moderating the unintended 
effects of overcriminalization, such as vague prohibitions and duplicative 
crimes that expand prosecutorial authority and other problems identified in 
this symposium. 
The cost-benefit analysis employed here is different from that used by 
economists when they evaluate the efficacy of new regulations.  The 
economists’ evaluation of collective investment projects or social programs 
reduces social factors to a common denominator, money.  In that sense, the 
analysis deals in commensurables, comparable factors that can be arrayed 
along a single dimension.  In contrast, the costs and benefits of 
criminalizing personal use infringement that were identified in the 
preceding analysis are not easily converted into dollars because the factors 
occupy many other dimensions.  The dollar loss that criminal infringement 
law prevents must be set against the resulting harm to copyright policy and 
                                                          
 78. For instance, this analysis did not consider whether the prevalence of plea bargains 
detracts from the deterrent benefit of enforcement.  See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA 
BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 223 (2003) (stating that, in 2001, ninety-four percent of cases 
adjudicated in federal district courts were resolved through plea bargains). 
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to the criminal justice system, factors that are difficult to convert to a 
monetary value.79  Weighing the gain to present and future copyright 
holders against the cost in decreased public use, the cost to copyright 
policy, and the possible lost credibility of criminal law is an exercise in 
weighing incommensurables.  Thus, an admitted shortcoming of defining 
overcriminalization through cost-benefit analysis is the difficulty, in the 
absence of a common dimension, of weighing them against each other to 
make a global estimate of costs and benefits.  Nevertheless, the difficulty of 
weighing factors that occupy different dimensions is not fatal.  Even if the 
factors are not susceptible to monetization80 and are incommensurable, they 
are still comparable.81 
The main advantage of defining overcriminalization through cost-benefit 
analysis is that the method compels Congress to confront the effects—
especially the costs—of treating conduct as criminal.  Identifying costs and 
benefits brings information into the decision-making process and opens a 
fuller range of considerations that might otherwise escape public attention.  
By forcing decision-makers to weigh or prioritize these factors, the method 
identifies important social considerations.82  Thus, even when costs and 
benefits cannot be readily reduced to a common metric like dollars, 
estimating them is still likely to produce a better and more transparent 
decision. 
In one sense, using cost benefit analysis to define overcriminalization 
accords with an underlying thrust of cost-benefit analysis in the 
administrative realm, which is to restrain the use of political considerations 
when making decisions.  The analysis will  necessarily reveal how a 
criminal law may privilege some interests and national policies and 
sacrifice others.  In addition, as other considerations rise to the forefront 
during the identification and evaluation stages of the analysis, political 
considerations may become less significant. 
The recommendation to utilize cost-benefit analysis when considering 
criminal legislation, although preliminary, merits further thought.  As a first 
step, consideration might be given to integrating a cost-benefit definition of 
overcriminalization into the legislative process as it actually occurs.  One 
issue is whether a cost-benefit analysis would alleviate the blurring of the 
                                                          
 79. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 149-53 (1982) (outlining 
difficulties in monetizing risks and costs); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability 
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 841 (1994) (pointing out that measuring social 
goods along a monetary metric can obscure the values hidden behind a dollar amount). 
 80. See Schauer, supra note 10, at 1215 n.3 (“[N]othing about the claim that all values 
are commensurable entails the claim that the common metric is money.”).  Schauer suggests 
other common metrics such as utility, self-expression, or virtue. 
 81. See id. at 1216 (distinguishing between commensurability and comparability). 
 82. See Sunstein, supra note 79, at 842-43 (arguing for a disaggregated accounting of 
effects in order to expose the full set of effects to public view). 
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institutional roles of Congress, the federal courts, and the executive branch 
that current academic research has identified in criminal lawmaking.83 
CONCLUSION 
While acknowledging a lack of precision because the many 
consequences of criminalization occupy different dimensions, the analytic 
method of cost-benefit analysis offers a working definition:  
overcriminalization occurs when a complete analysis of the consequences 
of treating conduct as criminal indicates that the costs of treating a matter 
as criminal outweigh the benefits.  This definition has the advantage of 
providing the content for debate over the substantive law at issue.  In 
identifying and classifying all the consequences of a new law, the analysis 
provides necessary input into the determination of whether proposed 
criminal legislation is appropriate, ineffective, or counterproductive.  The 
exercise recognizes that criminal laws impose costs as well as benefits.  
Advocating criminal penalties by invoking only likely benefits is somewhat 
disingenuous when its consequentialist justification requires an evaluation 
of all the effects of a criminal law. 
Widespread criminalization exacerbates almost every critical issue in the 
jurisprudence of white collar crime.  The issues affected include federalism 
and the federal role in criminal law, prosecutorial discretion and the power 
of prosecutors to obtain expansive interpretations of existing criminal laws, 
vagueness concerns and the preference of Congress to enact open-ended 
criminal laws, and the use of civil standards in evaluating criminal conduct.  
Yet it is difficult to tell when Congress is relying too much on criminal law 
to control conduct.  Using a uniform definition of the term 
“overcriminalization” based on cost-benefit analysis would facilitate 
discussion not only of overcriminalization but also of its consequences. 
 
                                                          
 83. See, e.g. generally Kahan, supra note 1, at 470; Richman, supra note 1, at 812. 
